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Fault Diagnosis of Gas Turbine Engines by Using Multiple Model Approach 
Zahra Abbasfard 
The field of fault detection and isolation (FDI) has attracted much attention in 
control theory during the last three decades which has resulted in development 
of sophisticated FDI algorithms. However, increasing the complexity of FDI 
algorithms is not necessarily feasible. Particularly for on-line FDI, the FDI unit 
must have the minimum possible computation cost to prevent any long delays in 
fault detection.  
In this research, we try to address the FDI problem of a single spool jet 
engine by using a modified linear multiple model (MM). We first develop a 
novel symbolic computation-based method for linearization purposes such that 
the obtained linear models are subjected to the symbolic fault variables. By 
substituting certain values for these symbolic variables, one can obtain different 
linear models, which describe mathematically the healthy and faulty models. In 
order to select the operating point, we use this fact that for a given constant fuel 
flow ( ௙ܹ), the system reaches a steady state, that is varying for different values of 
௙ܹ. Therefore, the operating points for linearization can be determined by the 
level of the Power Level Angel (PLA) (different values of ௙ܹ). These operating 
points are selected such that an observer, which is designed as a candidate for 
the healthy mode, can accurately estimates the states of the system in healthy 
scenario and the number of false alarm then would be kept to minimum. If the 
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system works at different operating points one can then discretize the ௙ܹ into 
different intervals such that in each interval a linear model represents the 
behavior of the original system. By using the obtained models for different 
operating points, one designs the corresponding FDI units. 
Second, we provide a modified multiple model (MM) approach to 
investigate the FDI problem of a single spool jet engine. The main advantage of 
this method lies in the fact that the proposed MM consists of a certain set of 
linear Kalman filter banks rather than using nonlinear Kalman filters such as the 
Extended Kalman Filter which requires more computational cost. Moreover, a 
hierarchical structural multiple model is used to detect and isolate multiple 
faults. The simulation results show the capability of the proposed method when 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION  
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a steady demand for man-made systems to be more efficient and accurate 
which calls for more sophisticated control algorithms. On the other hand, safety is a 
prominent requirement for every dynamical system [1]. The early fault detection can 
enable the system to be more reliable. Moreover, Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) can 
play a critical role in decreasing the maintenance cost [2, 3]. Therefore, the FDI methods 
are inevitable part of each control system [4].  
In the literature, fault diagnosis is used interchangeably to refer to the fault 
detection isolation and also fault detection, isolation and identification. The field of fault 
diagnosis has attracted much attention in control theory in the past few decades [5, 6]. 
Based on the fact that continuously increasing the complexity of dynamical systems 
calls for more sophisticated control algorithms, the FDI methods also have to be 
modified to overcome the complications. However, increasing the complexity of an FDI 
algorithm is not feasible in most of the applications particularly for on-line FDI in which 
the FDI unit must have the minimum possible computation cost to prevent any large 
delays in fault detection [5]. For example, if the fault detection information is supplied 
with delay it can result in total failure of the system, which leads to more cost and 
safety critical situations (a total fault in a jet engine may cause airplane crash [7]).   
Faults can occur at any part of the system such as the sensors, actuators or even in 
the components. Generally, Fault Detection (FD) can be defined as in detecting any 
malfunction that has a negative effect on the performance of the investigated system 
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based on sensor measurements, while Fault Isolation (FI) involves determining the 
location of the detected fault. In other words, the isolation of a fault (which is the next 
step after detection) provides the necessary information to locate the fault [5]. For 
example, after detecting a fault in the actuators of a dynamical system the FI unit 
enables us to determine the faulty actuator. This information is useful for the recovery 
and maintenance action [8].  
Traditional approach for FDI is hardware redundancy by using multiple sensors, 
actuators or components. In this approach, the FDI is based on the voting techniques 
[9]. However, hardware redundancy suffers from the couple of drawbacks, namely cost, 
complexity and physical limitations, which cause this approach to be impractical in 
many applications [8, 10, 11, 12]. For example, in an aircraft engine the fault in the 
efficiency of compressor cannot be resolved by hardware redundancy (using an extra 
compressor is not possible in this application).  
Another approach for fault diagnosis can be accomplished by performing certain 
techniques and algorithms that are known as analytical redundancy. Based on the 
available knowledge of the system, analytical redundancy can be categorized into three 
main approaches, namely model based, data-driven based and expert systems [10, 11, 
12]. In the model based approach the complete prior knowledge of the system allows 
one to represent the system as a mathematical model [5, 8, 6], while in the other 
approaches this mathematical model is not available. In the model based method, by 
using the mathematical model of the system and measured data the FDI objective is 
accomplished. In the data-driven based method [13], one first tries to fit a universal 
mathematical model (such as a neural network) to the available data (by performing a 
learning process) and then implements to FDI algorithms for this framework [9]. 
However, the third approach (expert systems) considers the investigated system as a set 
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of rules (for example, a certain number of fuzzy rules) obtained from experts [14, 15]. In 
this thesis we focus on the model based approach. 
Each model based FDI approach consists of two main units, namely as a residual 
generator unit and a decision-making unit [5, 10, 11, 12]. The residuals are generated by 
using a set of estimators, where the discrepancy of measured signal and estimated 
signal (that is provided by the estimator) is defined as the residual [5, 8]. Therefore, the 
residual for a fault free system is close to zero and when a fault occurs the residuals 
diverges from zero which indicates the fault occurrence [6]. The residual evaluation 
(decision making) unit is in charge of detecting and isolating the faults based on the 
residuals. Generally, the decision-making unit applies a decoding method to the 
residuals to detect and isolate the faults [10, 11, 12].   
1.2. MOTIVATION OF THE RESEARCH 
The FDI problem of nonlinear systems is an active research area in the control 
theory of dynamical systems. A highly complex FDI unit results in an increasing cost of 
computation and time. For example, the nonlinear approaches such as nonlinear 
Kalman filter demands a differentiation (for constructing the Jacobinan matrices ) in 
each time step. The idea of using approaches with lower complexity such as linear 
Kalman filter (with certain modifications) can overcome this problem. In this thesis, the 
FDI problem of the nonlinear systems is investigated by using a modified linear 
multiple model approach.  As a case study, we apply the proposed method to a type of 
gas turbine namely a single spool jet engine [16] . We focus on the aircraft jet engines in 
the cruise mode. Nevertheless, the proposed method can be applied to the industrial 
gas turbines, since the dynamics of this engine is similar to the aircraft engines in the 
cruise mode [9, 16].    
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During the last two decades, the fault detection and isolation problem of gas 
turbines has attracted an increasing interest [3, 16 (and reference therein)].  In addition 
to reliability (which is critical quite for jet engines), since the maintenance of engines is a 
highly cost and time consuming task, the early fault detection in these systems can 
decrease the cost significantly [17, 18]. 
On one hand, in the analytical redundancy-based approaches, complexity of the 
FDI unit is directly influenced by the complexity of the corresponding system. For 
example, the FDI unit for nonlinear systems is more sophisticated than the linear ones 
[8]. On the other hand, complicated FDI algorithms do not necessarily result in a better 
and more accurate diagnosis achievement [3, 6]. Roughly speaking, sophisticated FDI 
algorithms consume more time to perform the corresponding computations and 
therefore, the delay in fault analysis is inevitable. Also, complex algorithms need more 
hardware requirements. Hence, one needs to simplify the FDI algorithms as much as 
possible. These requirements can be critical where the compactness plays a crucial role 
in the system (for example, in aircraft and satellites) [6].  
In this thesis, a novel FDI algorithm for a single spool jet engine is developed. As 
we shall see, this system is a nonlinear dynamical system. However, the proposed 
method is based on the linearized model of the original system. This approach allows 
us to apply the linear FDI algorithms (for example Kalman filters) on the nonlinear 
original system with certain modifications. This approach results in an FDI method 
with lower complexity (compared with nonlinear algorithms such as unscented Kalman 
filters [19]) which is easy to implement. Based on the fact that the linearized model is 
only valid in small vicinity of the operating point1 which is used for linearization, we 
                                                 
1 By valid in small vicinity we mean that the discrepancy of the linearized system and the original one is 
negligible only in a small neighborhood of the operating point. 
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utilize a certain set of linearized systems for different operating points to capture the 
dynamical behavior of the original nonlinear system.  
The original system of the single spool engine is a highly nonlinear system. The 
main reason for this nonlinearity lies on the compressor and turbine maps [16]. The 
compressor map describes the behavior of the compressor under different operating 
points and is different from one engine to another one.  Therefore, in order to linearize 
the system one needs to utilize a computer-algebra based program. However, usually, 
the compressor map cannot be represented by a closed form function and is provided 
by manufactures as a look-up table, where linearization algorithms in MATLAB 
software can be performed numerically [20].  In this thesis, a new symbolic computation 
approach is developed to perform the linearization. By using this approach, one can 
add the faults to output of the certain blocks and compute a linear, symbolic model that 
is used to obtain different faulty models of the system for developing the multiple 
model FDI algorithm. Also, one only needs to linearize the system once and by 
substituting the corresponding value of faults obtains the different faulty models. 
 Moreover, for the FDI purpose, we develop a multiple model approach to detect, 
isolate and identify a certain set of faults in the engine. Furthermore, a hierarchical 
structure is developed to handle the diagnosis of the multiple fault scenarios. The 
robustness of the proposed method in the sensor total fault is investigated and it is 
shown that the approach is applicable with smaller set of measurements.  
1.3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As mentioned earlier, in the model based FDI approach the mathematical model of 
the investigated system is necessary to develop a residual generation unit that is based 
on the difference between the measured and estimated variables [21]. It should be 
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mentioned that this knowledge includes the differential equations (and more precisely 
sate space equations) of the dynamical system. 
1.3.1. FDI for Gas Turbine 
The gas turbine model is represented by a nonlinear dynamical system [2, 22]. In 
literature different methods for the FDI problem of gas turbine engines are provided. 
The survey [21] focuses on the model based FDI that are applicable for aerospace 
systems, and represents the key points of fault detection methods that rely on analytical 
redundancy.  In [19], by using an extended Kalman filter the nonlinear FDI problem of a 
single spool jet engine is investigated. Because of complexity of the gas turbine engine 
model, the statistical and empirical models have also been used for the FDI [21, 23]. 
Neural networks (such as dynamic and autoassociative) have been utilized for the 
single spool jet engine FDI problem in [9]. The author in [9] uses the autoassociative 
neural network for noise reduction purpose and dynamic neural network to accomplish 
the FDI mission. The random forest method is used in [24]. The random forest method 
is classified as a supervised learning method for the decision-making tree [24]. The FDI 
problem of an aircraft engine is investigated by using fusion models in [25]. In [2] the 
FDI problem of a dual spool jet engine is addressed. The authors in [2] propose a linear 
multiple model (while the original system is nonlinear). In this thesis, we provide a 
linear multiple model for fault diagnosis of the single spool jet engine. This work has 
two main differences as compared with the approach proposed in [2]. First, here we 
develop a novel linearization method based on the symbolic computation. Second, we 
introduce a linear-based FDI algorithm for the single spool jet engines. This issue is not 
completely investigated in [2].  
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1.3.2. Multiple-Model Based FDI 
One of the popular approaches for FDI purpose is the multiple model [2, 7]. In this 
subsection, we review the literature utilizing this scheme as an FDI approach. In the 
multiple model method, by using a bank of Kalman filters (linear or nonlinear), the FDI 
method has been performed. Particularly, this approach uses a set of Kalman filters 
(that each of them is designed for detecting a specific fault) such that all the filters but 
one have large output estimation error. According to the filter with the minimum error, 
one can detect and isolate the corresponding fault. This approach is also applied for 
nonlinear systems [26]. The author in [5] presents a survey on different model based 
methods in fault detection and isolation (FDI) in dynamical systems. It studies the 
robustness of the estimation (parameter and state) based techniques and investigates 
these methods for different systems. Comparing experimental results in different 
systems, it is pointed that the capability of the model based methods depends on the 
model accuracy; hence while these methods are really reasonable in some mechanical 
system such as aircraft, they are not very reliable in some other systems such as 
chemical plants. One of important aspect of the model-based FDI algorithm is the 
residual generation. In [5], the robustness of this unit is investigated on the number of 
available measurements. 
The authors in [27] explore the nonlinear behavior of aircraft during the fault 
scenarios and create multiple linear models of the system with MATLAB and Simulink. 
The controllability of the system at various points in the linear analysis can show that 
multi linear model is useful. Also it is shown how to recreate the nonlinear system from 
linear models [27]. In [28], the FDI problem of nonlinear systems is investigated where 
the Lyapunov-based technique is used to show the stability of the filters. 
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As mentioned earlier, in the multiple model approach one uses a set of observers. 
The Kalman filter is a suitable observer for state estimation; it has low computational 
cost and low memory requirements. Kalman filters are very popular because they are 
easy to use. In fact the Kalman filter is a well-known recursive state estimator for linear 
systems. In practice the algorithm is often used for nonlinear systems by linearizing the 
system’s process and measurement functions. Different Kalman filter variants linearize 
the functions in different ways. The quality of the estimates from different Kalman filter 
variants strongly depends on how these filters linearize the process and measurement 
functions and how they take linearization errors into account. 
The nonlinear Kalman filters are generally categorized into two subclasses, as 
Unscented (UKF) and Extended (EKF) Kalman filters. The UKF linearize process and 
measurement functions by a statistical linear regression of the functions through some 
“sampling points” in the “uncertainty region” around the state estimate. It defines the 
uncertainty due to the linearization errors as the covariance matrix of the deviations 
between the function values of the nonlinear and the linearized function in the 
sampling points. The EKF on the other hand only uses the function evaluation and its 
Jacobian in the state estimate. Also it needs trial and error for each particular example to 
obtain good values for the covariance matrix, which models the linearization errors [29]. 
1.3.3. Artificial Intelligence Based FDI  
Like other areas in the control theory, the artificial intelligence (AI) including 
fuzzy systems, neural networks and genetic algorithms has attracted a significant 
interest in the FDI problem. The authors in [30] outline some recent approaches to the 
generation of residual signals using methods by integrating quantitative and qualitative 
system knowledge, based on AI techniques. Also it gives an outline of AI methods that 
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are considered a powerful extension to quantitative analytical approaches for the FDI of 
dynamical systems.  
An overview of the artificial intelligence techniques to identify the faults in HVDC 
(High Voltage Direct Current) transmission system is provided in [31]. By using a 
neural network, fault diagnosis of permanent magnet synchronous motors under 
dynamic and mixed eccentricity fault diagnosis is investigated in [32] with artificial 
neural network. In [33] a frequency pattern and competent criterion is introduced for 
short-circuit-fault recognition in permanent magnet synchronous motors. In this 
approach SVM cluster is used for fault isolation purpose. Also, the demagnetization 
state of permanent magnets during fault conditions in a permanent magnet 
synchronous motor is addressed in [34].  
 In [35] by using a fuzzy neural network, the authors first address the uncertainty 
modeling and then the fuzzy rules are used for the fault diagnosis of the gas turbine 
engines. Also, the dynamic neural networks is used for fault diagnosis purposes in [36]. 
This network is belongs to a special class of neural networks as locally recurrent 
globally feed-forward. In [37], the FDI problem of the fuel-cell system is investigated, 
and also the fault tolerant control is addressed. In particular, they derive the fuzzy rule 
based on the measurements obtained from different cells, and then based on which unit 
is faulty the corresponding controller is updated. In [38] the FDI of an aircraft jet engine 
is accomplished by using dynamic neural networks. First, dynamic neural network is 
utilized to learn the dynamics of jet engine and then this model is used for FDI 
purposes. The authors in [39]  propose an FDI algorithm for the turbine. This method is 
based on fuzzy and support vector machine (SVM). First the normalized faulty 
symptoms are used for training the SVM. Then by combining the advantages of fuzzy 
theory with SVM a highly reliable FDI unit is designed. Moreover, in [40] condition 
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monitoring of a steam turbine by using neural networks is investigated. This approach 
is validated with the experimental data to detect and isolate the turbine bearings faults. 
 By analyzing insulation oil systems in the transforms, an artificial intelligence (AI) 
like neural network based FDI unit is developed in [41]. The fault detection is 
accomplished by using the statistical approaches in [42]. More precisely, the kurtosis 
and entropy of the output measurements are used to detect the fault. Then by using 
these two statistics as the input to a neural network, the detected fault is isolated.  In 
[43], an artificial intelligence based approach is used for the FDI problem of a 
navigation system gyroscope. This method is based on the Radial Basis Networks 
(RBF), where in order to train the network a fuzzy-genetic algorithm is used. The FDI 
problem in presence of uncertainty is addressed in [44]. The authors use two RBF 
networks. First, one RBF is trained to approximate the unknown nonlinear dynamics of 
the systems, and then the second network is utilized for the FDI purpose. 
In [45] the FDI problem of the rotating machinery is investigated by using time 
series analysis combined with artificial intelligence. Particularly, an Autoregressive 
(AR) model is used to detect the faults. Also, a neural network (with coefficients of the 
AR model as inputs and fault types as output) is applied to isolate the detected fault. In 
[46] by combining the discrete wavelet transform and auto-associative neural network  
an FDI algorithm is provided. The methodology for training neural networks in this 
paper is Levenberg–Marquardt (LM) algorithm. In [47] a new fault diagnosis technique 
is presented in which Extended State Observer (ESO) and soft computing are combined 
to overcome the lack of modeling knowledge.  
 Fault diagnosis in the computer networks has also made a great progress. In [48, 
49] this problem is addressed by using three different artificial intelligent approaches. 
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These approaches are expert systems, Bayesian networks and neural networks. The 
authors in [50] develop an approach for the FDI problem of analog circuits. The hybrid 
system that uses artificial neural networks and fuzzy systems is designed for this 
purpose. In [51] a method of fault diagnosis of satellite attitude control system based on 
data-driven combined with artificial intelligence is proposed in order to improve the 
reliability of the navigation satellite during its mission. 
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Chapter 2: BACKGROUND 
In this chapter, we will provide a review on the background required to realize the 
proposed approach in this thesis. First, the single spool jet engine model is described. 
Then it is followed by a brief introduction to the fault diagnosis methods based on the 
multiple model approach. 
2.1. AIRCRAFT JET ENGINE MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
A gas turbine engine is a complex system including upstream rotating compressor 
joined to a downstream turbine, and a combustion chamber between these two parts. 
Gas turbine is most commonly used for mobile propulsion in vehicles and portable 
machinery. The applications include jet aircraft, helicopters, large ships and electric 
generators [18]. In this section, the mathematical model of a single spool jet engine is 
reviewed. There are several representations of gas turbine mathematical model in the 
literature [16, 52, 22, 53]. By using thermodynamic and aerodynamic theories and basic 
laws in mechanics, one can develop a single model which includes all major 
components in the engine [19, 53, 52] such that the resulting nonlinear model can 
capture the functional relations between the engine variables, namely as pressures, 
temperatures and gas flow rates [53]. Particularly, rotor and volume dynamics are 
considered in order to obtain a nonlinear dynamics for the system [9]. In this thesis the 
modeling of the aircraft single spool jet engine which is available in [19] is used. The 
dynamics of this nonlinear model is represented in the MATLAB Simulink.  
The model of the engine components such as compressor and turbine are obtained 
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2.1.1.1. Intake Duct  
The intake duct is located before the compressor in order to recover as much of the 
total pressure of the free air stream as possible and to deliver this pressure to the front 
of the engine compressor. As a result, after intake duct, the temperature and the 
pressure of the inlet air are increased simultaneously [19, 53]. The input-output relation 












where ௗܲ, ௔ܲ௠௕, ߟௗ, ߛ and M are inlet pressure, ambient pressure, inlet efficiency, heat 
capacity ratio and Mach number, respectively. The inlet temperature ratio can be 









2.1.1.2. Compressor  
The combustion of fuel and air at normal atmospheric pressure will not produce 
sufficient energy to produce useful work. The energy released by combustion is 
proportional to the mass of input stream and its pressure. Hence, the higher pressure 
input gas results in a more efficient combustion cycle. The compressor in a gas turbine 
engine is in charge of providing high-pressure air to the combustion chamber. The 
compressor model is obtained by the related performance maps, which are following 
from the GSP software [19, 54]. The compressor consists of three main parts [53]: 
• Impeller 
• Diffuser 
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• Manifold 
Air leaves the Impeller at high speed, and flows through the diffuser, which 
converts high velocity, low-pressure fluid to the low-velocity, high-pressure stream. 
The diffuser also serves to lead airflow to the compressor manifold to increase the 
velocity and pressure that is satisfactory for high efficiency combustion cycle.  
For a given pressure ratio )( cπ  and the rotational speed )( θ
N , the mass flow rate 
is obtained as δ
θ





=θ  and δ = Pi
Po
.  Also, the efficiency )( cη  is computed 
from the performance map by using an appropriate interpolation technique [21]. 
According to these parameters, one can formulate the compressor temperature and the 















where cT  and dT  are the input and output gas temperature of the compressor and ௖ܹ is 
the power consumed by compressor, and J  and ܰ are the shaft moment of inertia and 
speed, respectively. Note that dT  is the diffuser output, and the ambient conditions are 
set to standard condition and the Mach number is 0.7 as a typical Mach number in 
cruise mode [9, 56]. Standard temperature and pressure (informally abbreviated as STP) 
are temperature of 273.15 K (0◦C, 32◦F) and absolute pressure of 100 kPa (14.504 psi, 
0.986 atm, 1 bar). 
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2.1.1.3. Combustion Chamber 
In the combustion chamber, a large amount of fuel that are supplied through fuel 
spray nozzles, is burned with extensive volumes of air that are provided by the 
compressor. The releasing heat is performed such that the mixture gas is expanded and 
accelerated to provide a smooth and uniform stream of heated flow. This task must be 
accomplished with the minimum loss in pressure and with the maximum heat release 
within the limited space available. In other words, the combustion chamber represents 
both the energy accumulation and the volume dynamics between the pressure 
compressor and the pressure turbine at the same time [19, 22]. The following equations 
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where ccT  and ccP are the gas temperature and pressure in the combustion chamber 
respectively. 
2.1.1.4. Turbine 
The product of the combustion chamber is forced into the turbine section, where 
the high velocity and volume of the gas flow is directed through a nozzle over the 
turbine blades. This flow spins the turbine which provides the necessary power for the 
compressor. As compressor section, the behavior of the turbine is represented by 
performance maps which vary from one engine to another. Again, for a given pressure 
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ratio )( Tπ and a specific fan speed )( θ













=δ .  
Also, the turbine efficiency )( Tη  is computed from the performance map. In this 
thesis we use the performance maps provided by the GSP software. According to these 
parameters one can obtained the turbine temperature drop TT  and the mechanical 
power WT  as: 























The nozzle is the exhaust duct of the jet engine. This is the final component of a jet 
engine which actually produces the thrust [22, 19]. The energy depleted airflow that 
passed the turbine, in addition to the colder air that bypassed the engine core, produces 
a force when exiting the nozzle that acts to propel the engine, and therefore the 
airplane, forward (or for the electrical generator this power is used to spin the shaft of 
the generator). The combination of the hot air and cold air are expelled to produce an 
exhaust, which causes a forward thrust. The relation between the input and output 
temperature of the nozzle ௡ܶ೔ and ௡ܶ೚, respectively, is represented by the following 
equation: 


























PTTT  (2.10) 
 
In the next subsection, we summarize the equations and provide the mathematical 
model for the gas turbine engine system. 
2.1.2. Complete Healthy Model 
As in [3, 9], we assume that Tn PP i =  and tn TT i = . Also, we assume that dC TT i =  and 
CCT TT i =  where iCT and iTT are the temperature of input flows to the compressor and 
turbine, respectively. Therefore, based on the preceding subsections and the fact that 
fan speeds of turbine section and compressor are identical, one can write  
( ) ( )[ ]






























































































 21  
 
Note that we assume ௧ܲ = ௡ܲ௢௭. It follows that the equation (2.11) is the state 
equation of the system. The output equation is given by [19] 
[ ]T,,,, tCtC PPTTNy =  (2.13)  
In Section 5.1.1, we investigate the effects of different sets of outputs on the FDI 
performance. 
2.1.3. Faulty Model 
In this section, we provide the faulty model of a single spool gas turbine engine. 
First, let us to introduce the potential sources of faults in the investigated nonlinear 
system. 
2.1.3.1. Potential Faults 
In this section, we define the faults that are considered in this work.  As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, fault is summarized as a malfunctioning in one of the system 
components.  As in other dynamical systems, all parts of a gas turbine engine are 
subject to faults. Generally, there are three types of faults, namely component fault, 
actuator fault and sensor fault. Investigation and finding the solution of component and 
actuator faults are more critical than sensor faults in the gas turbine because for 
preventing a sensor fault one can also use hardware redundancy but for the component 
and the actuator faults this method is not practical and monitoring the model plays an 
important role. 
 Also, the rotating parts of a gas turbine have high potential to be subjected to the 
faults than other parts. For example, a very small crack in the turbine or compressor 
blades is propagated easily because of the rotor speed [16]. Therefore, in this thesis, we 
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consider five different types of faults, namely: 
Decrease in the compressor flow capacity: mcF  
Decrease in the compressor efficiency: ecF  
Decrease in the turbine flow capacity: mtF  
Decrease in the turbine efficiency: etF  
Decrease in the effectiveness of the fuel actuator: wfF  
where corresponding to the fault free (or healthy) system, one can write  
1===== wfetmtecmc FFFFF . For the faulty system we set 10 ≤< mcF , 10 ≤< ecF , 
10 ≤< mtF , 10 ≤< etF  and 10 ≤< wfF . For example, 1<ecF  indicates that we have a 
fault in the compressor that results in decrease in the compressor efficiency. Note that 
the sever faults are represented by smaller values of wfetmtmc FFFFF ec ,,,, . For instance, 
the 2.0=ecF  denotes a fault in the compressor efficiency with a magnitude of 80%, 
where as 8.0=ecF  denotes the fault with a magnitude of 20%. 
2.1.3.2. State Space Equations 
From equations (2.11) and (2.12), it follows that the state space equation of a single 
spool jet engine subjected to faults (as introduced above) is given by 
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and the output equation is given by (2.13). 
Remark: Although the outputs ஼ܶ and ௧ܶ are subject to faults in the compressor and 
turbine efficiencies, respectively, these two faults are considered as sensor faults. The 
reason lies on the fact that in the sensor faults the measurements and actual outputs of 
the system have a discrepancy while here we assume that the measurement of all the 
outputs are accurate. Moreover, the sensor fault does not have any effect on the 
dynamics of the investigate system. However, by referring to equations (2.14) and 
(2.15), it follows that the faults in the compressor and turbine efficiencies affect the 
dynamics of the engine directly. 
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2.2. MULTIPLE MODEL APPROACH 
The goal of a fault detection and isolation system is to improve the reliability, 
availability and safety of a system. As mentioned earlier the traditional method for FDI 
is to use the hardware redundancy, and therefore fault diagnosis is achieved by using 
extra instruments. By using this approach the number of sensors, components and 
actuators increase and it causes an increase in the cost, weight, and complexity [5]. 
Another approach is to use the relations among the measured variables of different 
system parts. This concept is known as analytical redundancy and applies the 
redundant analytical relations among the different measured variables.  The analytical 
redundancy instead of using extra sensors or another equipment uses the mathematical 
model of the system [57]. 
Multiple model (MM) based approach is one of the analytical FDI approaches that 
has been proposed and applied to a large class of dynamical systems, such as jet 
engines [8, 58, 7, 59, 60, 28]. The goal of the MM approach is to provide a structure 
including a bank of filters for isolation and identification of faults. Typically, the filter 
used in the MM method is the Kalman filter.  Therefore, we first review the Kalman 
filter briefly in the following. 
2.2.1. Kalman Filter 
The Kalman filter is a set of mathematical equations to produce a statistically 
optimal estimation of the underlying system state, recursively [58, 6] . The optimality is 
accomplished by minimizing the mean of the squared error [61]. The inputs of this 
algorithm are inputs and noisy measured outputs of the investigated linear dynamical 
system [61]. The filter is very powerful from several points of view: it supports 
estimations of past and present state. Also, practically it has been shown that the 
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estimation accuracy is still acceptable even when the precise nature of the modeled 
system is unknown and there is uncertainty in the modeling process [61]. Furthermore, 
because of the algorithm's recursive nature, it can run in real time using only the 
present measurements and the previous estimation information. In other words, no 
additional past information is required [62, 1, 63, 64]. Based on these benefits as well as 
simplicity of the implementation, this filter has been extensively applied to a wide 
range of dynamical systems from chemical processes to flight control problems [61, 65, 
66].  
The Kalman filter has been extended to nonlinear systems through different 
schemes namely the Extended Kalman filter and Unscented Kalman filter [67]. 
However, in this thesis we focus on the linear Kalman filter. In the following subsection, 
the linear Kalman filter is reviewed in more detail.  
The Kalman filter tries to estimate the state x ∈ Rn of a discretized controlled 
system with input signal u ∈ Rl that is expressed by the following linear stochastic 
difference equation 




where A and B are the dynamic (state) and input matrices, respectively. The 
measurement of the system mRz ∈  is given by 




The random variables kw  and kv  denote the process and measurement noise, 
respectively. These random variables are assumed to be independent with the Gaussian 
probability distributions as 
 26  
 








In practice, the process noise covariance Q and the measurement noise covariance 
R matrices might change with each time step or measurement, however here we assume 
that they are constant. 
The Kalman filter can be written as a single equation, however it is most often 
conceptualized as two distinct phases, namely as "Predict (Time update)" and "Update 
(Measurement Update)" [61]. The predict phase uses the estimate state from the 
previous time step to produce a primary estimation at the current time step. This 
estimation is also known as the priori prediction (it does not include observation 
information from the current time step). In the update phase, the priori prediction is 
combined with current observation information to refine the final state estimation for 
the current time step. This improved estimate is termed as the posterior estimation [61]. 
Typically, the two phases alternate, with the prediction advancing the state until 
the next scheduled observation, and the update incorporating the observation. Also, if 
an observation is unavailable for some reason, the update may be skipped and multiple 
prediction steps performed. Likewise, if multiple independent observations are 
available at the same time, multiple update steps may be performed (typically with 
different observation matrices kH ) [61]. These features optimize the computation time, 
which is crucial for the online estimation purposes. In the next subsection, the equations 
of a typical Kalman filter are provided. 
2.2.1.1.  Kalman Filter Equations 
In this subsection, the equations of the Kalman filter are provided.  As mentioned 
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earlier, the filter has two set of operations namely predict and update [61]. These two 
steps are summarized in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 where kkx |ˆ  is the estimation of kx . 
Table 2.1: The time-update phase in the Kalman filter. 
Predicted (a priori) state estimate xˆk k−1 = Fk xˆk−1k−1 + BkUk  
Predicted (a priori) estimate covariance Pk k−1 = FkPk−1k−1Fk
T +Qk  
 
Table 2.2: The measurement-update phase in the Kalamn filter. 
Innovation or measurement residual yk = zk − Hk xˆk k−1 
Innovation (or residual) covariance Sk = HkPk k −1Hk
T + Rk 
Optimal Kalman gain Kk = Pk k −1Hk
T + Rk 
Updated (a posteriori) state estimate xˆk k = xˆk k−1 + Kk yˆk  
Updated estimate covariance Pk k = (I − KkHk )Pk k −1 
 
If the investigated model is accurate (there is no error in the modeling process) 
and the values for 00xˆ  and 00P  accurately reflect the distribution of the initial state 
values which are unknown, then the following invariants are preserv (all estimates have 
a mean error of zero): 
E[xk − xˆk k ] = E[xk − xˆk k−1] = 0




where [ ]⋅E  denotes the expected value operator. 
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2.2.2. Linear Multiple Model 
The primary feature of MM approach is a bank of K Kalman filters operating in 
parallel. These filters are dynamical systems with a vector of measurements kz and a 
vector of actuator control commands ku  as inputs and estimated output as the outputs. 
At every sample period, each of these K  filters produces an estimate of state jxˆ , and a 
vector of residuals jr , for Kj ,...,,2,1= . The idea is that the filter which produces the 
most well-behaved residuals, represent to the model that best matches the true failure 
status of the system [61, 59].  For more clarification, consider following linear system: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )







where w  and v  are the input and output noise with known variances Q  and R , 
respectively. If a fault (for example a component fault) occurs at the time instant fk  
then hkfk AAAA ff == −1, . In other words, at time  fk  the matrix A is changed. Therefore, 
the dynamics of the system is changed from healthy to a faulty one. In the MM model, a 
bank of observers is run in parallel such that each observer simulates a mode of the 
system, for example healthy or faulty system. Based on the output error of the observers 
(residuals), one can realize the valid observer. In another explanation, if the valid 
observer (the observer with the minimum output error) is the healthy one, no fault is 
detected in the system, otherwise based on which observer is selected then the fault is 
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detected, isolated and identified (the observers are constructed for different values of 
the fault magnitude).  For more clarification assume that we have only two models, 
healthy and faulty, respectively as 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )





















where kv  and kw are the system and output noise respectively. In the MM approach, an 
observer is designed for each model. Therefore, for the above equation, the observers 
are given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

























where  1L  and 2L  are the gain of the observers. Then based on the output error of the 
observers the fault can be detected.  
The selection of the valid observer is based on the hypothesis conditional 
probability that can be formulated as [3] 
( ) ( )( ) ( )

















where ( )( )1,|)( −kyikyf z  is the conditional probability density for current measurement 
for the ith observer [2].  
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Based on the value of ݌௜’s, one can obtain the valid model. For example, assume 
that at the time step k, the value of ݌ଵ is close to one and consequently the value of other 
݌௜’s are close to zero. In other words, the probability of model 1 is higher than the other 
models. This information shows that the model 1 is the valid model at the time step k. 
This approach is used in the FDI approach so that based on the highest probability one 
can determine the valid model. If the valid model is the faulty model the corresponding 
fault is detected and isolated.  
2.3. CONCLUSION 
In the model based FDI approaches, one needs the mathematical model of the 
investigated system. In this chapter, the mathematical model of a single spool jet engine 
has been reviewed. Generally, this model is a nonlinear dynamical system with four 
states, namely the combustion pressure and temperature, fan speed and turbine 
pressure. Also, five types of potential faults (that are loss of the turbine and compressor 
mass flows and efficiencies and fuel flow) are formulated and the faulty nonlinear 
model has been derived. Moreover, the multiple model approach which has a crucial 
role in the proposed FDI approach has been briefly reiewed. In particular, we reviewed 
Kalman filter that is followed by formulation for the probability of each model in the 
multiple model approach.  
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Chapter 3: SYMBOLIC LINEARIZATION 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the engineering area computation usually refers to numerical manipulation 
which deals with floating point numbers. However, during the last two decades 
another area in mathematics and computer science has increasingly attracted the 
attention which is called computer algebra or symbolic computation [20]. In this thesis 
this is known as Symbolic Computation (SC). While the numerical manipulation is 
performed (possibly with approximation) by the set of arithmetic operations on floating 
point numbers, the SC method emphasizes the computations (necessarily exact) on the 
mathematical expression containing variables and floating point numbers [20]. Based on 
the strong condition of the exact computation, the SC methods cannot be developed for 
systems with high complexity. Another limitation of the SC methods is presence of 
uncertainty in the investigated system [20]. For example, in the MATLAB software the 
equation including approximator unit such as neural networks or lookup tables cannot 
be solved by using the SC toolbox [20]. As mentioned earlier in Section 2.1, the Simulink 
model that is used in this work includes two lookup tables. Therefore, and based on the 
above explanation the linearization on the system (nonlinear single spool jet engine) 
cannot be accomplished by using the SC toolbox. However, to obtain the linear faulty 
models one needs first to linearize the system symbolically where the faults are 
expressed as variables. In this section we propose a novel method to overcome this 
problem.  
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3.2. A NOVEL SYMBOLIC LINEARIZATION METHOD 
In this thesis an approach to utilize the symbolic computation is proposed which is 
a cornerstone of the following FDI method explained in next chapters. Generally, the 
proposed method is based on this idea that if the faults can be presented by 
multiplication of fault variables and output of certain components of the system, then 
each component is linearized numerically and the fault symbolic variables are 
multiplied in the corresponding outputs. Before going into more details, it must be 
mentioned that in order to numerically linearize a Simulink model, one can use the 
linearize function that is embedded in MATLAB. The output of this function is four 
matrices (i.e. A, B, C and D) which determine the state space equation of the linearized 
system [20]. It is worth noting that this function also can be used for the algebraic model 





== , and the 
matrices A, B and C are not defined.  
In this section, we first explain the symbolic-based approach for the compressor 
and turbine in details. Then the results for the single spool jet engine are provided. Let 
us consider the compressor model that is presented in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: The compressor decomposition block. 


















where ݉஼, ݁஼ and ஼ܶ are the compressor mass flow, efficiency and temperature, 
respectively. Also, N and ஼ܲ஼ denote fan speed and combustion chamber pressure. Note 
that the sub-block models are algebraic (there is no dynamics in the compressor block). 













where ݑ௖௠௣ = ൤ ܰ஼ܲ஼൨. Note that each sub-block is an algebraic system. For example, in the 
mass flow block ݑ௖௠௣ is the input and ݉஼ is the output. The input for the temperature 
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sub-block is ݑ்௖ = ቂ
݁஼
஼ܲ஼ቃ. As mentioned above, one can linearize each block numerically 
and our proposed method relates to how one combines these linear systems to obtain 
the complete symbolic linearized model. Therefore, let us assume that the linearized 
models of the sub-blocks shown in Figure 3.1 are available. It follows that the linear 


































Note that all sub-blocks in the compressor are algebraic and as mentioned earlier 
the linearized system does not have the matrices A, B and C. Therefore, the linear model 






































It should be mentioned that one can compute the matrices ܦ௠௖, ܦ௘௖ and ܦ்௖ 
numerically and multiply the fault symbolic variables with the corresponding block 
output. Hence, one can compute the symbolic linear model of the compressor by using 
the numerically linearized model of the sub-blocks that are shown in Figure 3.1.  
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Remark: In order to utilize the linearized function in the way explained above, one 
should decompose the compressor in sub-blocks such that the fault variables are 
multiplied with the output of certain sub-blocks. Also, these sub-blocks are not real 
components in the engine. For example, the compressor component may not be 
physically decomposed into them. However, we know that combination of these sub-
blocks express the compressor model and capture the nonlinear behaviour of this 
component. 
We can use the same approach to symbolically linearize the turbine component. 
Consider the turbine block of the engine as provided in Figure 3.2. As shown in Figure 
3.2, the turbine component can be presented as four interconnected sub-blocks such that 
the corresponding faults are multiplied with certain outputs. 
 
Figure 3.2: Turbine block decomposition. 
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Note that the sub-block N is the only one which is a dynamical system. In other 
words, for the turbine block N is the state, and although ஼ܶ஼, ஼ܲ஼ and ௡ܲ௢௭ are the states 
for the single spool gas turbine, they are considered as input to the turbine block. Also, 
as can be observed from Figure 3.2 by decomposing the turbine component one can 
present the faults as the multiplication variable in certain point (efficiency and mass 
flow sub-blocks). Note that the symbolic variables denoting the faults (refer to Section 
2.1.3.1) are added to the output of the corresponding sub-blocks. We merge these four 
sub-blocks by using the method explained earlier to obtain a single state space model 
for the turbine. Therefore, the turbine subsystem has the fault variable in the matrices A, 











































 and N is the fan speed.   
Recall that ஼ܶ஼ and ஼ܲ஼ are combustion chamber temperature and pressure, 
respectively. Also,  ௡ܲ௢௭, ஼ܶ and ஼ܲ are the nozzle pressure and compressor temperature 
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(3.9) 
 






















Integration of the above sub-blocks result in the following faulty linear model for 
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where the superscripts denote the elements of the corresponding vector (or row-vector). 
For example, 1etD denotes the first element of etD  or 4NB  denotes the forth element of NB . 
Based on the assumption that there is no fault in the nozzle and combustion 
chamber block, one can linear these blocks numerically. The linear model of the nozzle 











where ௡ܲ௢௭ is the nozzle pressure and ݑ௡௢௭ = ൤ ௧ܶ݉௧൨. Note that ܣ௡௢௭ and ܤ௡௢௭ are  1 × 1 





































































































 in which co
e Figure 3.1 a
pectively.































 40  
 
Based on the symbolic model of each component (compressor and turbine), one 
can find the symbolic linear model of the single spool gas turbine as follows. The linear 













൪ and ݑ = ݓ݂ and ݕ is defined in equation (2.13).  
The matrix A is given by 
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The input matrix is given by 





















B  (3.18) 
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Note that each element of the linear system matrices is a symbolic polynomial of 
the faults values. Also, based on the fact that a single spool engine is a strictly proper 
system [54, 16], the matrix D is always equal to the zero matrix. In order to obtain a 
faulty system with certain fault magnitude, one can substitute the corresponding value 
of the fault parameters ( wfetmtmc FFFFF ec ,,,, ) in the symbolic state space model 
represented by equations (3.17) to (3.20). 
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3.4. SIMULATION RESULTS 
In this section, we simulate the linearized system that is obtained in the previous 
section for the fault free case. Moreover, we compare the linear and nonlinear systems 
to show that the linear system can capture the dynamics of the original nonlinear 
system. It must be mentioned that the linear system, in fact, includes a set of linear 
systems for different operating points. As we explain in the next chapter the different 
operating point of the single spool jet engine can be determined by different values of 
fuel flow ( ௙ܹ). We use the operating point with ௙ܹ ∈ {0.3,0.5,0.7,0.9} (the reason for this 
selection is explained in the next chapter) to obtain the linearized systems. The profile of 
௙ܹ for the simulations below is shown in Figure 3.4. 
 
Figure 3.4: One profile of the fuel flow selected for the healthy scenario. 
The outputs of the linear and nonlinear systems are summarized in Figure 3.5 to 
Figure 3.9. 
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Figure 3.5: The output N of the linearized and the original system for the healthy scenario.  
 
Figure 3.6: The output ࢀ࡯ of the linearized and the original system for the healthy scenario.  
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Figure 3.7: The output ࢀࢀ of the linearized and the original system for the healthy scenario.  
 
 
Figure 3.8: The output ࡼ࡯ of the linearized and the original system for the healthy scenario.  
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Figure 3.9: The output ࡼࢀ of the linearized and the original system for the healthy scenario.  
It should be mentioned that the initial conditions for the simulations are the steady 
state values of ஼ܶ஼ , ஼ܲ஼ , ܰ and  ்ܲ when ௙ܹ = 0.3. In other words, by setting ௙ܹ = 0.3, 
we run the Simulink model and the steady state values have been selected as the initial 
conditions for the simulations.  As follows we show the results for different sets of 
initial conditions. In order to quantify the ability of the linearized model to capture the 
nonlinear model, we define the metric as the mean value of the difference between the 


















in which ௗܰ is number of all the available simulation data. Also, iLout and 
i
Nout are the ith 
data for the investigated output of the linear and nonlinear models, respectively. 
The simulation results for different values of the initial conditions are shown in 
Table 3.1 where the initial conditions are determined by different values of W୤. Also, for 
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each output we use equation (3.21) to compute the average error. 
Table 3.1:The average output difference (equation (3.21)) between the nonlinear single spool 
and the linear model obtained by the proposed symbolic linearization method.   
Initial condition 
                    ( ௙ܹ) 
Outputs 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 
ܰ 33.79 23.29 14.41 8 8.8 8.11 9.67 11.69 13.49 15.05
஼ܶ 1.43 0.84 0.5 0.25 0.32 0.33 0.37 0.43 0.48 0.53 
்ܶ 6.67 5.83 5.32 4.7 5.45 6.21 7 7.78 8.61 9.5 
஼ܲ 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
்ܲ 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
By considering Figure 3.5 to Figure 3.9 and Table 3.1, it follows that the linearized 
model can capture the behaviour of the nonlinear system quite closely. As we shall see 
in the next chapter this linearized model can be utilized for the FDI purpose.  
3.5. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter a novel symbolic linearization method is developed for systems 
that cannot be linearized symbolically by using the existing symbolic computation 
toolboxes.  By using this method, one can obtain the linearized model of a nonlinear 
system such that the fault variables are represented as a set of symbolic variables. This 
symbolic model enables us to track the effects of each fault in the linear system. Also, 
the different faulty models corresponding to different values of the fault can be easily 
obtained by substituting the value of the fault in the symbolic model. This method has 
been applied to the nonlinear single spool jet engine to obtain the symbolic linearized 
system for different operating points. The simulation results have also been provided to 
show the capability of the linearized model. These results have been performed for 
different set of initial conditions to show the accuracy of the obtained linear models. 
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Chapter 4: FAULT DIAGNOSIS OF GAS 
TURBINE 
In this chapter, we provide the FDI logics that is used in this thesis for single fault 
scenarios. In the next chapter, we provide a hierarchical structure for multiple fault 
scenarios. The main difference between this approach and the approach proposed in [2] 
can be viewed in the decision making unit. Here, we introduce a methodology to 
measure the detection and isolation time. For this purpose, one needs to define a 
threshold. This threshold is defined on the probability values rather than on the 
observer errors. This threshold is obtained by Monte Carlo simulations.  
4.1. MODIFIED MULTIPLE MODEL 
As well-known, at a sufficiently small vicinity of each operating point, the 
dynamics of a nonlinear system can be captured by a linear model [2], and hence in this 
region the healthy and faulty models (that are used in multiple model approach) can be 
expressed by the corresponding linear models. Therefore, one can accomplish the FDI 
objective by using the linear multiple model provided that the original system operates 
in this vicinity.  
The operating points of the jet engine can be determined by the value of the fuel 
flow (i.e. W୤) [2]. If the system works at different operating point one can discretize the 
W୤ into different intervals such that in each interval a linear model captures the 
behavior of the original system. Then using the obtained models for different operating 
points one performs the FDI objective. In this approach, we modify the multiple model 
(MM) approach that is proposed in [3], which is a standard MM, equipped by a tool to 
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select the correct linear bank of observers that are based on the value of W୤ for 
distinguishing the fault detection and isolation. This enables us to quantify the multiple 
model approaches which is useful for comparison purposes. In the proposed approach, 
the current bank of observers in the MM method is selected based on the value of W୤. 
Then the current operating mode of the engine (healthy or faulty) is determined based 
on the maximum probability of the current operating point that is selected based on the 
value of W୤. Finally, by defining a threshold on the model probabilities one can detect 
and isolate the faults.  
Furthermore, we show that with a smaller set of operating points as compared to 
[3], the FDI objective can be accomplished. Moreover, it should be noted that in the 
proposed method one needs to linearize the nonlinear model once, while in the 
approach proposed in [2], for each fault, the nonlinear model must be linearized 
separately. Therefore, our proposed method has lower computational cost, although as 
we shall see in Section 4.2.6, the FDI approach is accomplished with the same accuracy 
as that obtained in [2]. Below, we define a methodology for the FDI logic. 
4.1.1. FDI Logic for Single Faults 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, in the multiple model approach the probability of 
different model enables us to determine the valid model. If the valid model is the 
healthy one, then no fault is detected otherwise based on which model is valid the 
corresponding fault is detected and isolated. However, when a fault occurs in the 
system, it generally takes some time so that the probability of a corresponding model 
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Figure 4.3: The simulation result for the fault which occurs at t=5 sec in compressor efficiency 
(noisy measurement). 
In order to address this problem we normalize the output of the models by using a 
set of multiplicative factors. These scaling numbers are also used for the actual 





where 12000, 590, 900, 8 and 3 represent the nominal values of the outputs yଵ to yହ , 
respectively in equation (2.13). The simulation results for the same scenario shown in 
Figure 4.3 is now provided in Figure 4.4. However, as can be seen the detection and 
isolation times are increased in this case (as compared to Figure 4.2).  
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Figure 4.4: The simulation result for the fault which occurs at t=5 sec in compressor efficiency 
(modified and normalized output). 
4.1.3. Determining the Operating Points 
As mentioned earlier, in this thesis we use a set of bank of filters where each filter 
is valid for a vicinity of an operating point. With higher number of filters the results are 
more accurate however the computational cost will be higher too. Therefore, there is a 
trade-off between the number of operating points and computational cost. In this 
subsection, we obtain the minimum number of operating points such that all the 
considered faults are detectable.  
To obtain the minimum interval between the operating points, we use a bank that 
is obtained for 9.0=fW  (the typical value of the fuel flow for the cruise mode changes 
from 0.85 to 0.95 [2]). The proposed FDI approach is then performed for single fault 
scenarios for different values of fW . Table 4.1 shows the results of the FDI for all faults 
where × and √ denote the false alarm flag and correct detection and isolation flag, 
respectively. Note that the FDI logic that was explained in the preceding subsection was 
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used to obtain the resolution Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: The FDI results for different incremental changes of nominal ࢃࢌ and ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૢ in 
which the bank of observer is constructed. The symbol × denotes false alarm flag. 
  Incremental  Change from 
 Nominal   fW  
Faults                        
0.05 0.1 0.2 0.25 0.3 
etf  √ √ √ × × 
ecf  √ √ √ √ × 
mtf  √ √ √ × × 
mcf  √ √ √ × × 
wff  √ √ √ √ × 
It follows from Table 4.1 that the incremental changes of 0.05, 0.1 and 0.2 yield 
acceptable FDI results. According to the fact that with an interval of 0.2 we need less 
bank of observers we select the interval as 0.2. Therefore, we construct the banks for 
{ }9.0,7.0,5.0,3.0=fW . Note that although the typical value of the fW  is between 0.85 and 
0.95, however the banks of observers for { }9.0,7.0,5.0,3.0=fW  are used. In this way, one 
can tackle the FDI problem for the other values of Wf  which can occur (not common) in 
the cruise mode.  
4.2. SINGLE FAULT SIMULATION RESULTS 
In this section, the simulation results for different scenarios are provided. The 
results are categorized into several subsections corresponding to various scenarios. In 
the single fault scenarios, a comprehensive set of results for different magnitudes of 
faults are provided. Furthermore, the simulation results by using the approach that is 
proposed in [2] are also reported in this section for comparative study. Finally, 
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summarizing tables are provided in the summary subsection of this section. 
The simulations are performed on the cruise condition with four different values 
of Wf = {0.4, 0.55, 0.7, 0.85} . The ambient conditions are set to standard condition; that is 
the Mach number is 0.7 as a typical number in the cruise mode [56]. Standard 
temperature and pressure (informally abbreviated as STP) are temperature of 273.15 K 
(0◦C, 32◦F) and absolute pressure of 100 kPa (14.504 psi, 0.986 atm, 1 bar).  
By using several linearized models, which are obtained corresponding to several 
operating points, we construct the bank of observers (Kalman filters). These operating 
points are obtained based on different values of fW . For the simulations we choose as 
the nominal fW  given by { }9.0,7.0,5.0,3.0=fW , as explained in Section 4.1.3. The 
scenarios in this section are as follows: 
Scenario I (healthy scenario): In this scenario, no fault occurs in the system.   
Scenario II (single fault in the turbine efficiency): In this scenario we assume 
that a fault (decrease in the turbine efficiency) occurs at the time instant t =5 sec. 
Scenario III (single fault in the compressor efficiency): In this scenario a fault 
(decrease in the compressor efficiency) occurs at the time instant t =5 sec.  
Scenario IV (single fault in the mass flow of turbine): This scenario simulates a 
fault (decrease in the turbine mass flow) which occurs at the time instant t =5 sec. 
Scenario V (single fault in the mass flow of compressor): This scenario simulates 
a fault (decrease in the compressor mass flow) which occurs at the time instant t =5 sec. 
Scenario VI (single fault in the effectiveness of fuel flow): In this scenario a loss 
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of fuel flow effectiveness occurs at the time instant t =5 sec. 
Note that the above scenarios with certain magnitudes are provided in the 
following subsections. Each subsection is devoted to a specific magnitude. Also, we 
show the results forWf = 0.85 and the results for the other values of fW are only 
summarized in Section 4.2.6. 
4.2.1. Faults with Magnitude 2% 
In this subsection, the simulation results for the scenarios I-V are provided. The 
magnitude of all the faults is 2%. The faulty models that are used for this subsection are 
summarized in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: The different models corresponding to the healthy and faulty modes that are used in 
the simulation for each operating point. 
Model Mode #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 
 Healthy 2% fault in etF  2% fault in ecF  2% fault in mtF  2% fault in mcF  5% fault in fW  
It is worth noting that the minimum detectable magnitude of the fault in the fuel 
flow effectiveness ( fW ) is 5%. For this reason we only consider this level of fault 
severity in fW . 
4.2.1.1. Scenario I 
The simulation results for the healthy scenario are shown in Figure 4.5. The 
probability of each model is shown by ip where i denotes the model mode as provided 
in Table 4.2. Also, ߤ denotes the value of the probabilities which is between zero and 
one. 
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Figure 4.5: Simulation result for the healthy scenario by using the proposed method with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. 1p  denotes the probability of the healthy mode validity (for the mode labels refer to Table 
4.2).  
The simulation result by using the approach proposed in [2] is provided in Figure 
4.6.  
 
Figure 4.6: Simulation result for the healthy scenario by using the approach proposed in [2] with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. 1p  denotes the probability of the healthy model validity (for the mode labels refer to 
Table 4.2) .  
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4.2.1.2. Scenario II 
In this scenario, one fault occurs in the turbine efficiency at the time instant t = 5 
sec. The magnitude of the fault is 0.02 ( 98.0=etF ).  Figure 4.7 shows the results for this 
scenario. Figure 4.8 shows the results that are obtained by using the approach that is 
proposed in [2] for comparison. 
 
Figure 4.7: The simulation result for the scenario II by using the proposed method with ࢃࢌ =
૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.02 ( 98.0=etF ) occurs in the turbine efficiency at t = 5sec (for the 
mode labels refer to Table 4.2). 
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Figure 4.8: The simulation result for the scenario II by using the approach proposed in [2] with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.02 ( 98.0=etF ) occurs in the turbine efficiency at t = 5sec (for the 
mode labels refer to Table 4.2). 
4.2.1.3. Scenario III 
In this scenario, one fault occurs in the compressor efficiency at time instant t = 5 
sec. The magnitude of the fault is 0.02 ( 98.0=ecF ). Figure 4.9 shows the result for this 
scenario. Figure 4.10 shows the results that are obtained by using the approach that is 
proposed in [2] for comparison. 
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Figure 4.9: The simulation result for the scenario III by using the proposed method with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.02 ( 98.0=ecF ) occurs in the compressor efficiency at t = 5sec (for 
the mode labels refer to Table 4.2). 
 
Figure 4.10: The simulation result for the scenario III by using the approach proposed in [2] with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.02 ( 98.0=ecF ) occurs in the compressor efficiency at t = 5sec (for 
the mode labels refer to Table 4.2 ). 
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4.2.1.4. Scenario IV 
In this scenario, we assume that the system is subjected to a fault in the turbine 
mass flow at time instant t = 5 sec. The magnitude of the fault is 0.02 ( 98.0=mtF ). Figure 
4.12 shows the results that are obtained by using the approach that is proposed in [2] for 
comparison. 
 
Figure 4.11: The simulation result for the scenario IV by using the proposed method with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.02 ( 98.0=mtF ) occurs in the turbine mass flow at t = 5sec (for 
the mode labels refer to Table 4.2). 
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Figure 4.12: The simulation result for the scenario IV by using the approach proposed in [2] with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.02 ( 98.0=mtF ) occurs in the turbine mass flow at t = 5sec (for 
the mode labels refer to Table 4.2). 
 
4.2.1.5. Scenario V 
In this scenario a fault occurs in the compressor mass flow at t = 5sec. the 
magnitude of the fault is 0.02 ( 98.0=mcF ). Figure 4.14 shows the results that are 
obtained by using the approach that is proposed in [2] for comparison. 
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Figure 4.13: The simulation result the for scenario V by using the proposed method with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.02 ( 98.0=mcF ) occurs in the compressor mass flow at t = 5sec 
(for the mode labels refer to Table 4.2 ). 
 
Figure 4.14: The simulation result for the scenario V by using the approach proposed in [2] with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.02 ( 98.0=mcF ) occurs in the compressor mass flow at t = 5sec 
(for the mode labels refer to Table 4.2) 
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4.2.2. Faults with Magnitude 5% 
In this subsection, the simulation results for the scenarios I-V are presented. The 
magnitude of all the faults is 5%. The faulty models that are used for this subsection are 
summarized in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3: The different models corresponding to the healthy and faulty modes (5% magnitude) 
that are used in the simulation for each operating point. 
Model Mode #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 
 Healthy 5% fault in etF  5% fault in ecF  5% fault in mtF  5% fault in mcF  5% fault in fW  
 
4.2.2.1. Scenario II 
In this scenario, one fault occurs in the turbine efficiency at time instant t = 5 sec. 
The magnitude of the fault is 0.05 ( 95.0=etF ).  Figure 4.15 shows the result for this 
scenario. Figure 4.16 shows the results that are obtained by using the approach that is 
proposed in [2] for comparison. 
 
Figure 4.15: The simulation result for the scenario II by using the proposed method with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.05 ( 95.0=etF ) occurs in the turbine efficiency at t = 5sec (for the 
mode labels refer to Table 4.3). 
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Figure 4.16: The simulation result for the scenario II by using the approach proposed in [2] with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.052 ( 95.0=etF ) occurs in the turbine efficiency at t = 5sec (for 
the mode labels refer to Table 4.3). 
4.2.2.2. Scenario III 
In this scenario, one fault occurs in the compressor efficiency at time instant t = 5 
sec. The magnitude of the fault is 0.05 ( 95.0=ecF ). Figure 4.17 shows the result for this 
scenario. Figure 4.18 shows the results that are obtained by using the approach that is 
proposed in [2] for comparison. 
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Figure 4.17: The simulation result for the scenario III by using the proposed method with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.05 ( 95.0=ecF ) occurs in the compressor efficiency at t = 5sec (for 
the mode labels refer to Table 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.18: The simulation result for the scenario III by using the approach proposed in [2] with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.05 ( 95.0=ecF ) occurs in the compressor efficiency at t = 5sec (for 
the mode labels refer to Table 4.3). 
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4.2.2.3. Scenario IV 
In this scenario, we assume that the system is subjected to a fault in the turbine 
mass flow at time instant t = 5 sec. The magnitude of the fault is 0.05 ( 95.0=mtF ). Figure 




Figure 4.19: The simulation result for the scenario IV by using the proposed method with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.05 ( 95.0=mtF ) occurs in the turbine mass flow at t = 5sec (for 
the mode labels refer to Table 4.3). 












 67  
 
 
Figure 4.20: The simulation result for the scenario IV by using the approach proposed in [2] with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.05 ( 95.0=mtF ) occurs in the turbine mass flow at t = 5sec (for 
the mode labels refer to Table 4.3). 
4.2.2.4. Scenario V 
In this scenario a fault occurs in the compressor mass flow at t = 5sec. the 
magnitude of the fault is 0.05 ( 95.0=mcF ). Figure 4.22 shows the results that are 
obtained by using the approach that is proposed in [2] for comparison. 
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Figure 4.21: The simulation result for the scenario V by using the proposed method with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.05 ( 95.0=mcF ) occurs in the compressor mass flow at t = 5sec 
(for the mode labels refer to Table 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.22: The simulation result for the scenario V by using the approach proposed in [2] with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.05( 95.0=mcF ) occurs in the compressor mass flow at t = 5sec 
(for the mode labels refer to Table 4.3). 
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4.2.3. Faults with Magnitude 8% 
In this subsection, the simulation results for the scenarios I-V are presented. The 
magnitude of all the faults is 8%. The faulty models that are used for this subsection are 
summarized in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: The different models corresponding to the healthy and faulty modes (8% magnitude) 
that are used in the simulation for each operating point. 
Model Mode #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 
 Healthy 8% fault in etF  8% fault in ecF  8% fault in mtF  8%fault in mcF   8% fault in fW  
4.2.3.1. Scenario II 
In this scenario, one fault occurs in the turbine efficiency at time instant t = 5 sec. 
The magnitude of the fault is 0.08 ( 92.0=etF ).  Figure 4.23 shows the result for this 
scenario. Figure 4.24 shows the results that are obtained by using the approach that is 
proposed in [2] for comparison. 
 
Figure 4.23: The simulation result for the scenario II by using the proposed method with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.08 ( 92.0=etF ) occurs in the turbine efficiency at t = 5sec (for 
the mode labels refer to Table 4.4). 
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Figure 4.24: The simulation result for the scenario II by using the approach proposed in [2] with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.08 ( 92.0=etF ) occurs in the turbine efficiency at t = 5sec (for 
the mode labels refer to Table 4.4). 
4.2.3.2. Scenario III 
In this scenario, one fault occurs in the compressor efficiency at time instant t = 5 
sec. The magnitude of the fault is 0.08 ( 92.0=ecF ). Figure 4.25 shows the result for this 
scenario. Figure 4.26 shows the results that are obtained by using the approach that is 
proposed in [2] for comparison.  
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Figure 4.25: The simulation result for the scenario III by using the proposed method with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.08 ( 92.0=ecF ) occurs in the compressor efficiency at t = 5sec (for 
the mode labels refer to Table 4.4). 
 
Figure 4.26: The simulation result for the scenario III by using the approach proposed in [2] with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.08 ( 92.0=ecF ) occurs in the compressor efficiency at t = 5sec (for 
the mode labels refer to Table 4.4). 
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4.2.3.3. Scenario IV 
In this scenario, we assume that the system is subjected to a fault in the turbine 
mass flow at time instant t = 5 sec. The magnitude of the fault is 0.08 ( 92.0=mtF ). Figure 
4.28 shows the results that are obtained by using the approach that is proposed in [2] for 
comparison. 
 
Figure 4.27: The simulation result for the scenario IV by using the proposed method with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.08 ( 92.0=mtF ) occurs in the turbine mass flow at t = 5sec (for 
the mode labels refer to Table 4.4). 
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Figure 4.28: The simulation result for the scenario IV by using the approach proposed in [2] with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.08 ( 92.0=mtF ) occurs in the turbine mass flow at t = 5sec (for 
the mode labels refer to Table 4.4). 
4.2.3.4. Scenario V 
In this scenario a fault occurs in the compressor mass flow at t = 5sec. the 
magnitude of the fault is 0.08 ( 92.0=mcF ). Figure 4.30 shows the results that are 
obtained by using the approach that is proposed in [2] for comparison. 
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Figure 4.29: The simulation result for the scenario V by using the proposed method with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.08 ( 92.0=mcF ) occurs in the compressor mass flow at t = 5sec 
(for the mode labels refer to Table 4.4). 
 
Figure 4.30: The simulation result for the scenario V by using the approach proposed in [2] with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.02 ( 92.0=mcF ) occurs in the compressor mass flow at t = 5sec 
(for the mode labels refer to Table 4.4). 
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4.2.4. Faults with Magnitude 10% 
In this subsection, the simulation results for the scenarios I-V are presented. The 
magnitude of all the faults is 10%. The faulty models that are used for this subsection 
are summarized in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5: The different models corresponding to the healthy and faulty modes (10% magnitude) 
that are used in the simulation for each operating point. 
Model Mode #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 
 Healthy 10% fault in etF  10% fault in ecF  10% fault in mtF  10%fault in mcF   10% fault in fW  
4.2.4.1. Scenario II 
In this scenario, one fault occurs in the turbine efficiency at time instant t = 5 sec. 
The magnitude of the fault is 0.1 ( 9.0=etF ). Figure 4.31  shows the result for this 
scenario. Figure 4.32 shows the results that are obtained by using the approach that is 
proposed in [2] for comparison. 
 
Figure 4.31: The simulation result for the scenario II by using the proposed method with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.1 ( 9.0=etF ) occurs in the turbine efficiency at t = 5sec (for the 
mode labels refer to Table 4.5). 
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Figure 4.32: The simulation result for the scenario II by using the approach proposed in [2] with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.1 ( 9.0=etF ) occurs in the turbine efficiency at t = 5sec (for the 
mode labels refer to Table 4.5). 
4.2.4.2. Scenario III 
In this scenario, one fault occurs in the compressor efficiency at time instant t = 5 
sec. The magnitude of the fault is 0.1 ( 9.0=ecF ). Figure 4.33 shows the result for this 
scenario. Figure 4.34 shows the results that are obtained by using the approach that is 
proposed in [2] for comparison. 
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Figure 4.33: The simulation result for the scenario III by using the proposed method with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.1 ( 9.0=ecF ) occurs in the compressor efficiency at t = 5sec (for 
the mode labels refer to Table 4.5). 
 
Figure 4.34: The simulation result for scenario III by using the approach proposed in [2] with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.1( 9.0=ecF ) occurs in the compressor efficiency at t = 5sec (for 
the mode labels refer to Table 4.5). 
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4.2.4.3. Scenario IV 
In this scenario, we assume that the system is subjected to a fault in the turbine 
mass flow at time instant t = 5 sec. The magnitude of the fault is 0.1 ( 9.0=mtF ). Figure 
4.36 shows the results that are obtained by using the approach that is proposed in [2]  
for comparison. 
 
Figure 4.35: The simulation result for the scenario IV by using the proposed method with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.1 ( 9.0=mtF ) occurs in the turbine mass flow at t = 5sec (for the 
mode labels refer to Table 4.5). 
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Figure 4.36: The simulation result for the scenario IV by using the approach proposed in [2] with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.1 ( 9.0=mtF ) occurs in the turbine mass flow at t = 5sec (for the 
mode labels refer to Table 4.5). 
4.2.4.4. Scenario V 
In this scenario a fault occurs in the compressor mass flow at t = 5sec. the magnitude 
of the fault is 0.1 ( 9.0=mcF ). Figure 4.38 shows the results that are obtained by using 
the approach that is proposed in [2] for comparison. 
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Figure 4.37: The simulation result for the scenario V by using the proposed method with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.1 ( 9.0=mcF ) occurs in the compressor mass flow at t = 5sec (for 
the mode labels refer to Table 4.5). 
 
Figure 4.38: The simulation result for the scenario V by using the approach proposed in [2] with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.1 ( 9.0=mcF ) occurs in the compressor mass flow at t = 5sec (for 
the mode labels refer to Table 4.5). 
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4.2.5. Effectiveness Loss of Fuel Flow  
In this scenario, we assume that a loss of effectiveness occurs in the fuel flow 
actuator at t = 5 sec. The simulation results for different magnitudes of faults are 
provided as follows.  
4.2.5.1. Fault with Magnitude 5% 
Figure 4.39  and Figure 4.40 provide the simulation results for the scenario VI 
which simulates a single fault in the fuel flow actuator occurring at t = 5sec with a 
magnitude of 0.05 ( 95.0=wfF ). 
 
Figure 4.39: The simulation result for the scenario VI by using the proposed method with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.05 ( 95.0=wfF ) occurs in effectiveness of fuel flow actuator at t 
= 5sec (for the mode labels refer to Table 4.2). 
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Figure 4.40: The simulation result for the scenario VI by using the approach proposed in [2] with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.05 ( 95.0=wfF ) occurs in effectiveness of fuel flow actuator at t 
= 5sec (for the mode labels refer to Table 4.2). 
 
4.2.5.2. Fault with Magnitude 8% 
Figure 4.41 and Figure 4.42 provides the simulation results for the scenario VI 
which simulates a single fault in the fuel flow actuator occurring at t = 5sec with a 
magnitude of 0.08 ( 92.0=wfF ). 
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Figure 4.41: The simulation result for the scenario VI by using the proposed method with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.08 ( 92.0=wfF ) occurs in effectiveness of fuel flow actuator at t 
= 5sec (for the mode labels refer to Table 4.4). 
 
Figure 4.42: The simulation result for the scenario IV by using the approach proposed in [2] with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.08 ( 92.0=wfF ) occurs in effectiveness of fuel flow actuator at t 
= 5sec (for the mode labels refer to Table 4.4). 
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4.2.5.3. Fault with Magnitude 10% 
Figure 4.43 and Figure 4.44 provides the simulation results for the scenario VI 
which simulates a single fault in the fuel flow actuator occurring at t = 5sec with a 
magnitude of 0.1 ( 9.0=wfF ). 
 
Figure 4.43: The simulation result for the scenario VI with ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 
0.1 ( 9.0=wfF ) occurs in effectiveness of fuel flow actuator at t = 5sec (for the mode labels refer to 
Table 4.5). 
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Figure 4.44: The simulation result for the scenario IV by using the approach proposed in [2] with 
ࢃࢌ = ૙. ૡ૞. A fault with magnitude 0.1 ( 9.0=wfF ) occurs in effectiveness of fuel flow actuator at t = 
5sec (for the mode labels refer to Table 4.5). 
4.2.6. Summary 
In this subsection, we have summarized the simulation results for different values 
of ࢃࢌ = {૙. ૝, ૙. ૞૞, ૙. ૠ, ૙. ૡ૞} . The results are provided in Table 4.6 to Table 4.13. 
Table 4.6: The summary of simulation results for different values of ࢝ࢌ by using our proposed 
approach. Dt and It denote the detection and isolation times, respectively. The magnitude of the faults 
is equal to 2%. 
               Scenarios  







Dt  It  Dt  It  Dt  It  Dt  It  
4.0=fw  6.42 7.7 5.66 6.62 5.89 7.18 6.63 13.06
55.0=fw  5.97 7.27 5.35 6.23 5.61 6.62 5.72 7.83 
7.0=fw  6.31 7.73 5.46 6.13 5.53 6.55 5.38 6.32 
85.0=fw  6.32 7.87 5.36 6.23 5.52 6.4 5.44 6.95 
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Table 4.7: The summary of simulation results for different values of ࢝ࢌ by using the proposed 
approach in [2]. Dt and It denote the detection and isolation times, respectively.  The magnitude of the 
faults is equal to 2%. 
 
               Scenarios  
Fuel flow         





Dt  It  Dt  It  Dt  It  Dt  It  
4.0=fw  6.42 7.65 5.71 6.65 5.64 6.62 6.54 12.39
55.0=fw  6.22 7.49 5.35 5.91 5.6 6.55 5.73 7.83 
7.0=fw  6.32 7.7 5.48 6.98 5.79 6.57 5.58 6.88 




Table 4.8: The summary of simulation results for different values of ࢝ࢌ by using our proposed 
approach. Dt and It denote the detection and isolation times, respectively. The magnitude of the faults 
is equal to 5%. 
               Scenarios  







Dt  It  Dt  It  Dt  It  Dt  It  
4.0=fw  5.59 6.24 5.09 5.43 5.26 5.59 5.36 6.21 
55.0=fw  5.79 6.11 5.1 5.3 5.33 5.62 5.14 5.42 
7.0=fw  5.58 6.1 5.1 5.14 5.33 5.62 5.11 5.34 
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Table 4.9: The summary of simulation results for different values of ࢝ࢌ by using the proposed 
approach in [2]. Dt and It denote the detection and isolation times, respectively.  The magnitude of the 
faults is equal to 5%. 
 
               Scenarios  
Fuel flow         





Dt  It  Dt  It  Dt  It  Dt  It  
4.0=fw  5.94 6.34 5.12 5.29 5.38 5.56 5.38 5.83 
55.0=fw  5.73 6.13 5.11 5.32 5.36 5.57 5.12 5.42 
7.0=fw  5.53 6.1 5.08 5.27 5.52 5.7 5.19 5.42 
85.0=fw  5.58 5.71 5.08 5.2 5.35 5.42 5.14 5.27 
 
 
Table 4.10The summary of simulation results for different values of ࢝ࢌ by using our proposed 
approach. Dt and It denote the detection and isolation times, respectively. The magnitude of the faults 
is equal to 8%. 
               Scenarios  







Dt  It  Dt  It  Dt  It  Dt  It  
4.0=fw  5.51 6.06 5.04 5.15 5.14 5.29 5.15 5.58 
55.0=fw  5.51 5.73 5.05 5.09 5.26 5.48 5.09 5.19 
7.0=fw  5.5 5.88 5.04 5.07 5.26 5.34 5.08 5.19 
85.0=fw  5.52 5.8 5.04 5.11 5.25 5.37 5.07 5.19 
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Table 4.11: The summary of simulation results for different values of ࢝ࢌ by using the proposed 
approach in [2]. Dt and It denote the detection and isolation times, respectively.  The magnitude of the 
faults is equal to 8%. 
 
               Scenarios  
Fuel flow         





Dt  It  Dt  It  Dt  It  Dt  It  
4.0=fw  5.52 5.91 5.05 5.28 5.25 5.38 5.17 5.36 
55.0=fw  5.66 5.86 5.05 5.08 5.26 5.37 5.08 5.16 
7.0=fw  5.47 5.85 5.04 5.16 5.27 5.39 5.09 5.23 
85.0=fw  5.45 5.72 5.04 5.07 5.25 5.39 5.1 5.17 
 
Table 4.12: The summary of simulation results for different values of ࢝ࢌ by using our proposed 
approach. Dt and It denote the detection and isolation times, respectively. The magnitude of the faults 
is equal to 10%. 
               Scenarios  







Dt  It  Dt  It  Dt  It  Dt  It  
4.0=fw  5.7 5.85 5.04 5.16 5.12 5.37 5.11 5.36 
55.0=fw  5.47 5.61 5.03 5.07 5.24 5.33 5.08 5.15 
7.0=fw  5.46 5.83 5.03 5.05 5.25 5.38 5.08 5.16 
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Table 4.13: The summary of simulation results for different values of ࢝ࢌ by using the proposed 
approach in [2]. Dt and It denote the detection and isolation times, respectively.  The magnitude of the 
faults is equal to 10%. 
 
               Scenarios  
Fuel flow  





Dt  It  Dt  It  Dt  It  Dt  It  
4.0=fw  5.47 5.77 5.06 5.3 5.21 5.35 5.14 5.29 
55.0=fw  5.44 5.77 5.04 5.18 5.25 5.34 5.08 5.22 
7.0=fw  5.44 5.75 5.03 5.09 5.25 5.32 5.08 5.16 
85.0=fw  5.43 5.6 5.03 5.13 5.23 5.32 5.05 5.13 
It follows from the results provided in the above tables that 
1. By increasing the magnitude of a fault not only the detection time decreases 
(which is expected because of the difference between the faulty and the 
healthy systems), but also the isolation time is lower as compared with smaller 
fault magnitudes. 
2. Although our proposed method has lower computational cost (note we 
symbolically linearized the jet engine only once), the detection and isolation 
times are almost the same another ones obtained by using the approach 
introduced in [2]. 
 
4.3. NUMBER OF OBSERVERS 
In the previous section, the number of modes in the multiple model is equal to 21 
(that is one healthy mode and 20 faulty modes (for different values of ௙ܹ) as shown in 
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Tables 4.2 to 4.5). In this section, we investigate the impact of the banks with larger 
number of modes (observers) in our proposed approach. A bank with larger number of 
filters enables one to identify the fault magnitudes more accurately (that is higher 
resolution). However, increasing the number of the filters can decrease the efficiency of 
the MM method [7]. In this part, we run all the filters (one healthy model and 20 faulty 
models for the fault 2%, 5%, 8% and 10%) in parallel. However, we investigate the 
scenarios that the injected fault severities are not equal to these values. In other words, 
the injected faults have the severities 3%, 6%, 7% and 9% in the scenarios II-V in the 
previous section.  
In this section, the probabilities of different modes are defined in follows:  ݌ଵ 
denotes the probability of the healthy mode. ݌ଶ, ݌଻, ݌ଵଵ and ݌ଵହ denote the modes 
corresponding to ܨ௘௧ = 0.98, ܨ௘௧ = 0.95, ܨ௘௧ = 0.92 and ܨ௘௧ = 0.9, respectively. The 
probabilities of the modes corresponding to ܨ௘௖ = 0.98, ܨ௘௖ = 0.95, ܨ௘௖ = 0.92 and 
ܨ௘௖ = 0.9 are shown by ݌ଷ, ݌଼, ݌ଵଶ and ݌ଵ଺, respectively. ݌ସ, ݌ଽ, ݌ଵଷ and ݌ଵ଻ denote the 
probabilities of the modes corresponding to ܨ௠௧ = 0.98, ܨ௠௧ = 0.95, ܨ௠௧ = 0.92 and 
ܨ௠௧ = 0.9, respectively. The faulty modes ܨ௠௖ = 0.98, ܨ௠௖ = 0.95, ܨ௠௖ = 0.92 and 
ܨ௠௖ = 0.9 are denoted by ݌ହ, ݌ଵ଴, ݌ଵସ and ݌ଵ଼, respectively. Finally, ݌଺, ݌ଵଽ, ݌ଶ଴ denote the 
faulty modes corresponding to ܨ௪௙ = 0.95, ܨ௪௙ = 0.92 and ܨ௪௙ = 0.9. 
 Figure 4.45 to Figure 4.48 show the results for scenario II with the magnitudes 3%, 
6%, 7% and 9%. As can be seen in these figures, the filter which simulates the fault with 
lower to the injected fault is valid. For example, in Figure 4.46 filter with magnitude 2% 
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probabilities. Note that in this case, the fault is accurately detected. 
4.4. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the FDI logic that is used in this thesis is presented. In the 
proposed method a set of observer banks is used for the FDI propose. This method has 
been applied to the single spool gas turbine. The banks of Kalman filters are constructed 
based on different operating points that are determined by the value of the fuel flow. It 
is shown that by considering a predefined threshold for the model probabilities one can 
decrease the false flags.  By using this technique, it is shown that if the operating points 
that are selected such that 2.0=Δ fW  the proposed method can detect and isolate all 
faults that are introduced in Chapter 1.  
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Chapter 5  MODIFICATIONS TO THE FDI 
APPROACH 
In this chapter, two further issues related to the proposed approach are 
investigated. We first address the multiple-fault scenarios in which the FDI approach 
introduced in the previous chapter is not applicable. Then the robustness of the FDI 
method with respect to total faults in the sensors is investigated. This study not only 
shows the applicability of the proposed method in the sensor failure cases, but also 
indicates that one can use a smaller set of measurements for the FDI purpose.    
5.1. FDI DIAGNOSIS OF MULTIPLE FAULTS 
As explained in the previous chapter, the proposed method can detect and isolate 
a single fault. However, this approach is not applicable for multiple-fault scenarios. For 
instance, Figure 5.1 shows the result of the proposed method for a multiple-fault 
scenario. In this scenario, a decreasing fault (with a magnitude of 2%) in the turbine 
efficiency occurs at the time instant t = 8sec, and a loss in the turbine mass flow (with a 
magnitude of 5%) occurs at t = 20sec. As shown in Figure 5.1, although the proposed 
method can detect and isolate the first fault, it is not able to isolate the second fault.  
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Figure 5.1: The probability of the models for a multiple-fault scenario. The faults with 
magnitude 2% and 5% occur in the turbine efficiency and mass flow at t=8esc and t=20sec, respectively. 
The proposed method in the previous chapter cannot isolate the second fault. 
Below a modified approach that is proposed in [3, 59] is utilized to overcome the 
problem that is shown in Figure 5.1. Note that we apply this method to the linear banks 
constructed by the method proposed in Chapter 3. As the method provided in the 
previous chapter, the new approach is based on the multiple model methodology. In 
this method a bank of observers are run in parallel in order to detect and isolate the first 
fault. After the isolation of the first fault the bank is updated with the new structure that 
is called the Level 2 bank such that the second fault can be detected and isolated.  
More precisely, this method is a hierarchical approach. Based on the assumption 
that the engine starts from the healthy condition, first Level 1 banks are active. The 
Level 1 banks are those that are used in the previous chapters to detect and isolate the 
first fault. It is worth nothing that the active bank is selected based on the value of ௙ܹ 
and at each time only one bank is active (the details for Level 1 banks have been 
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provided in Section 4.1). After detection and isolation of the first fault, the 
corresponding Level 2 bank (based on the isolated fault and ௙ܹ) is utilized to detect and 
isolate the second fault.  
Remark: The Level 2 bank used only when the first fault is isolated, and based on the 
isolated fault only one Level 2 bank will be activated. Also, after the corresponding 
Level 2 bank activation, the Level 1 bank is deactivated. This technique enables us to 
decrease the computational cost as compared with the approach in which one runs all 
models (models for a single fault and models for multiple faults) in parallel. Moreover, 
in this approach we assume that there is no simultaneous multiple fault occurrence and 
there is a minimum time interval between the first fault and the second one, and this 
minimum time interval is greater than the time is needed to isolate the first fault (for 
instance, see Table 4.6).   
For more clarification, assume that at the time instant 1tt = sec the fault 98.0=etF  (a 
fault in the turbine efficiency with a magnitude of 2%) is isolated. The corresponding 
Level 2 bank for this case is shown in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: The selected Level 2 bank after isolating the fault 02.0=etF . Note that all models 
include this fault. 
Model 
Modes 
#1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 



































Note that all models include the isolated fault 98.0=etF . The model for 95.0=etF  
can be viewed as a model with a fault 03.098.0 −=etF . One can construct the Level 2 
bank for the other faults in the same way. Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 summarize the Level 1 
and Level 2 banks that are used for the faults with a magnitude of 2% in ܨ௘௧, ܨ௘௖, ܨ௠௧, 
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and ܨ௠௖ and 5% in ܨ௪௙. 
Table 5.2: The Level 1 bank used for multiple fault diagnosis. 
Models 
Modes Healthy 98.0=etF  98.0=ecF  98.0=mtF  98.0=mcF  95.0=wfF
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5.1.1. Simulation Results 
In this section, we provide the simulation results for the following scenarios. It is 
worth noting that all the parameters, except the fault magnitude and occurrence time 
are the same as in Section 4.2. 
Scenario I (multiple faults in the turbine efficiency and compressor mass flow): 
In this scenario we assume that a fault with a magnitude of 2% (decrease in the turbine 
efficiency) occurs at the time instant t =8 sec, and then at the time instant t=20 sec another 
fault with a magnitude of 2% occurs in the compressor mass flow. The results are 
shown in Figure 5.2. 
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Scenario II (multiple faults in the turbine): In this scenario a fault with a 
magnitude of 2% (decrease in the turbine efficiency) occurs at the time instant t =8 sec, 
and then at the time instant t=20 sec another fault with a magnitude of 2% occurs in the 
turbine mass flow. The results are shown in Figure 5.3. 
Scenario III (multiple faults in the turbine efficiency and fuel flow): This 
scenario simulates multiple faults (decrease) in the turbine efficiency and fuel flow 
which occur at the time instant t =8 sec and t=20 sec with magnitudes 2% and 5%, 
respectively. The results are shown in Figure 5.4. 
Scenario IV (multiple faults in the compressor mass flow and fuel flow): In this 
scenario, multiple faults (decrease) in the compressor mass flow and fuel flow occur at 
the time instant t =8 sec and t=20 sec with magnitudes 2% and 5%, respectively. The 
results are shown in Figure 5.5. 
Scenario V (multiple faults in the turbine mass flow and compressor efficiency): 
This scenario simulates multiple faults (decrease) in the turbine efficiency and 
compressor mass flow and fuel flow which occur at the time instant t =8 sec and t=20 sec 
with magnitudes 2% and 2%, respectively. The results are shown in Figure 5.6. 
Figure 5.2 provides the result of Scenario I by using the proposed Level 2 method. 
As can be seen, first the turbine efficiency fault is detected and then the bank label 1 in 
Table 5.3 is activated. Then the second fault which is a fault in the compressor mass 
flow is detected and isolated.     
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Figure 5.2: Simulation results of Scenario I, multiple faults in the turbine efficiency and 
compressor mass flow with a magnitude of 2% occurs at t=8sec and t=20sec, respectively. 
Figure 5.3 shows the result of Scenario II by using the Level 2 method. As Figure 
5.3 shows, first a fault in the turbine efficiency is detected and isolated and again the 
bank label 1 in Table 5.3 is activated. However, in this scenario a fault in the turbine 
mass flow is detected and isolated as the second fault. 
 
Figure 5.3: Simulation results of Scenario II, multiple faults in the turbine efficiency and mass 
flow with a magnitude of 2% occurs at t=8sec and t=20sec, respectively. 
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The result of Scenario III by using the Level 2 method is shown in Figure 5.4. 
Again in this simulation, first a fault in the turbine efficiency is detected and isolated, 
and then a fault in the fuel flow effectiveness is isolated.  
 
Figure 5.4: Simulation results of Scenario III, multiple faults in the turbine efficiency and fuel 
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The result of Scenario IV by using the Level 2 method is shown in Figure 5.5.   
 
Figure 5.5: Simulation results of Scenario IV, multiple faults in the compressor mass flow and 
fuel flow with a magnitude 2% and 5% occur at t=8sec and t=20sec, respectively. 
In Figure 5.5, a fault in the compressor mass flow is detected and isolated as the 
first fault. Then the bank number 4 in Table 5.3 is activated. The second fault which is a 
fault in the fuel flow effectiveness is detected and isolated. 
Figure 5.6 shows the result of Scenario V by using the Level 2 method. The first 
fault that is a fault in the turbine mass flow is detected and isolated. Then the Bank label 
3 is activated and a fault in the compressor efficiency is detected and isolated as the 
second fault. 
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Figure 5.6: Simulation results of Scenario V, multiple faults in the turbine mass flow and 
compressor efficiency with a magnitude 2% occur at t=8sec and t=20sec, respectively. 
 Table 5.4 summarizes the results corresponding to Scenarios I-V 
Table 5.4: The detection and isolation time of scenarios I-V. ࢀࡰ and ࢀࡵ denote the detection and 
isolation time, respectively. In all the scenarios, first fault occurs at t=8sec and second one occurs at 
t=20sec.  
Scenarios First fault Second fault 
஽ܶ ூܶ ஽ܶ ூܶ
I 8.36 9.48 20.05 20.11 
II 8.35 9.48 20.19 20.82 
III 8.35 9.48 20.09 20.17 
IV 8.06 8.17 20.09 20.19 
V 8.16 8.73 20.2 20.69 
 
5.2. OUTPUT SELECTION 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, we consider the following outputs for a single spool 
jet engine, that is 
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[ ]TtCtC PPTTNy ,,,,=  (5.1) 
where TCTc PPTTN ,,,, denote the fan speed, the compressor temperature, the turbine 
temperature, the compressor pressure and the turbine pressure. In this section, we show 
that with lower number of measurements the FDI can still be accomplished. However, 
detection and isolation times are increased. The output selection enables us to 
investigate the robustness of the proposed methodology due to loss of measurements.  
In this case we analysis two different set of outputs as follow  
1. [ ]tCC PPTNy ,,,= . 
2. [ ]tCC PPTy ,,= . 
In this section, we first investigate the system observability for different sets of 
outputs which is then followed by the simulation results. 
5.2.1. Investigation of the Observability 
Let us consider the nonlinear system (2.14), where one can find the linear model 
for the different values of fW (recall that the steady state points are determined with 
values of fW ). For example, the fault free linear model for 4.0=fW  is given by 























































in which we consider equation (5.1) as the output function.  
By using the matrices A and C  one can test the observability of the corresponding 
linear system. Therefore, we can investigate the observability of the linear systems for 
different values of fW and different sets of output equations. Table 5.5 summarizes the 
results for this investigation. It is worth noting that the symbols √ and × denote that the 
corresponding linear system is observable and unobservable, respectively. 
Table 5.5: The Observability test results by using different sets of outputs and different values 
of fW . The symbols √ and × designate the observability and unobservability, respectively. 
௙ܹ 
Outputs 
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
[ ]TtCC PPTN ,,,  √ √ √ √ √ √ 
[ ]TtCC PPT ,,  × √ × √ √ √ 
[ ]TtC PP ,  × × × × × × 
tP  × × × × × × 
[ ]TtC PPN ,,  √ × √ √ × √ 
[ ]TtPN,  × × × × × × 
[ ]TCC PT ,  × √ √ √ √ × 
[ ]TtC PT ,  × × × × × × 
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As can be observed, for the output sets [ ]TtCC PPTNy ,,,=  the linear models for all 
steady state points are observable. 
5.2.2. Simulation Results 
In the following simulation results, we consider the following scenarios with 
௙ܹ = 0.8. 
Scenario I: A fault in the turbine efficiency occurs at t=5sec with a magnitude of 
2% ( 98.0=etF ). 
Scenario II: A fault in the compressor efficiency occurs at t=5sec with a magnitude 
of 2% ( 98.0=ecF ). 
Scenario III: A fault in the turbine mass flow occurs at t=5sec with a magnitude of 
2% ( 98.0=mtF ). 
Scenario IV: A fault in the compressor mass flow occurs at t=5sec with a 
magnitude of 2% ( 98.0=mcF ). 
Scenario V: A loss of effectiveness of fuel flow occurs at t=5sec with a magnitude 
of 5% ( 95.0=wfF ). 
5.2.2.1. Simulation Results for [ ]tCC PPTNy ,,,1 =  
The simulation results for the Scenarios I to V are shown in Figure 5.7 to Figure 
5.11 . In these simulations we consider [ ]tCC PPTNy ,,,1 =  as the available measurement. 
As can be observed from Figure 5.7 to Figure 5.11, the faults in all scenarios are detected 
and isolated. Note that the system with [ ]tCC PPTNy ,,,1 = as measurement is observable 
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for all value of ௙ܹ (Table 5.5). 
 
Figure 5.7: The probability of the models for Scenario I with [ ]tCC PPTNy ,,,= . A fault with a 
magnitude of 2% occurs in the turbine efficiency at t=5sec. 
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Figure 5.8: The probability of the models for Scenario II with [ ]tCC PPTNy ,,,= . A fault with a 
magnitude of 2% occurs in the compressor efficiency at t=5sec. 
 
Figure 5.9: The probability of the models for Scenario III with [ ]tCC PPTNy ,,,= . A fault with a 
magnitude of 2% occurs in the turbine mass flow at t=5sec. 
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Figure 5.10: The probability of the models for Scenario IV with a [ ]tCC PPTNy ,,,= . A fault with 
a magnitude of 2% occurs in the compressor mass flow at t=5sec. 
 
Figure 5.11: The probability of the models for Scenario V with [ ]tCC PPTNy ,,,= . A loss of 
effectiveness of fuel flow with a magnitude of 5% occurs at t=5sec. 
 
5.2.2.2. Simulation Results for [ ]tCC PPTy ,,=  
The simulation results for the Scenarios I to V are shown in Figure 5.12 to Figure 
5.16. In these simulations we consider [ ]tCC PPTy ,,=  as the available measurement. By 
using [ ]tCC PPTy ,,= the system is not observable for all ௙ܹ (refer to Table 5.5). However, 
for 0.7 ≤ ௙ܹ ≤ 0.9, the system is observable. Therefore, as can be observed from Figure 
5.12 to Figure 5.16, the FDI unit can detect and isolate the faults properly.  
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Figure 5.12: The probability of the models for Scenario I with [ ]tCC PPTy ,,= . A fault with a 
magnitude of 2% occurs in the turbine efficiency at t=5sec. 
 
Figure 5.13: The probability of the models for Scenario II with [ ]tCC PPTy ,,= . A fault with a 
magnitude of 2% occurs in the compressor efficiency at t=5sec. 
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Figure 5.14: The probability of the models for Scenario III with [ ]tCC PPTy ,,= . A fault with a 
magnitude of 2% occurs in the turbine mass flow at t=5sec. 
 
Figure 5.15: The probability of the models for Scenario IV with [ ]tCC PPTy ,,= . A fault with a 
magnitude of 2% occurs in the compressor mass flow at t=5sec. 
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In this chapter, the proposed FDI approach in chapter 4 has been modified such 
that the multiple-fault scenarios can be handled. Particularly, a hierarchical structure is 
utilized in order to detect and to isolate multiple faults. In this structure, after isolating 
the first fault a new bank is replaced. This bank which is called the Level 2 bank is in 
charge of detecting and isolating the second fault. Furthermore, the robustness of the 
proposed approach in the previous chapter is analyzed. We investigated the 
observability of the linear models for different sets of outputs and steady state points. It 
has been shown that the linear models with [ ]TtCC PPTNy ,,,=  (without measuring the 
turbine temperature) are still observable and the FDI mission can be accomplished.  
Also, the simulation results for different fault scenarios indicate the capability of the 
proposed FDI method even when one has a lower number of measurements. 
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Chapter 6 CONCLUSIONS AND 
SUGGESTIONS 
In this thesis, the FDI problem of a special gas turbine (single spool jet engine in 
cruise mode) has been investigated. Broadly speaking, we first develop a novel 
symbolic linearization method for a class of nonlinear systems. By using the linearized 
models for fault-free and faulty systems, we develop an FDI algorithm based on the 
multiple-model approach. Finally, we applied our proposed method to single spool gas 
turbine jet engine. Below, we first summarize the thesis by providing the main 
contributions of the thesis in more precise terms, and then the suggestions for the future 
work are provided. 
6.1. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS 
6.1.1. Develop a Novel Symbolic Linearization Method 
In this approach, we combine the numerical methods with a novel symbolic 
computation approach to obtain a linear model of a nonlinear system such that the fault 
variables affect the linear model symbolically. In particular, in order to implement the 
proposed symbolic linearization method, the original nonlinear model is first 
decomposed to sub-blocks such that the fault variables are multiplied whit the outputs 
of a certain set of these sub-systems, and then each sub-block is linearized numerically. 
Finally, these linear sub-blocks (by considering faults as the symbolic variables) are 
combined to obtain the linear symbolic model. 
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6.1.2. Develop the Modified Multiple Model FDI  
The proposed FDI algorithm is based on the symbolic linear system that is 
obtained in the previous step. More precisely, by using the symbolic model, the linear 
models of the system for different operating points are obtained (this set of models 
contains the linear fault-free and faulty systems). Then a modified linear multiple 
model FDI algorithm (based on linear models) is performed on the original nonlinear 
system. This modified approach is equipped with an observer selecting unit such that 
for each vicinity around a certain operating point the corresponding bank of observer is 
select. The observer of this bank is constructed based on the linear model of the original 
nonlinear system at the corresponding operating point. Also, a hierarchical structure is 
used to improve the FDI unit. By this modification the FDI algorithm can detect and 
isolate multiple faults. 
In summary, the proposed FDI algorithm has two main features namely linearity 
and hierarchical structure. The linearity enables one to accomplish the FDI mission with 
lower computational time as compared to the nonlinear model while the hierarchical 
structure has been developed to handle multiple fault scenarios. 
6.1.3. The FDI problem of the Single Spool Gas Turbine 
  In this part, as the case study, we consider a nonlinear model of a single spool gas 
turbine engine. Because of the complexity of the model, particularly compressor and 
turbine map, this system cannot be linearized symbolically by using the existing 
symbolic computation toolboxes. Therefore, the proposed symbolic linearization 
method has been applied to this system. Simulation results show that linear model 
obtained by using the proposed method can capture the behavior of the nonlinear 
system in a vicinity of the corresponding operating point. 
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Also, for the FDI purpose the modified multiple model is applied to the 
investigated system. This approach has two main features namely linearity and 
hierarchical structure. To decrease the negative effects of the measurement noise, we 
provide a relatively simple (however efficient) method that can decrease the false 
alarms significantly. Moreover, to investigate the robustness of the proposed method 
we performed the approach by using different set of measurements. The observability 
of linear models has been investigated and it was shown that with a samller set of 
measurements, one can still accomplish the FDI mission. The simulation results support 
the capability of the proposed method. 
6.2.  SUGGESTIONS 
In this section, we provide the suggestions for future work. These suggestions are 
categorized into two different groups as theoretic and application. In the theoretic part, 
we focus on the proposed linearization method, while in the application subsection the 
suggestions for the case study (gas turbines) are provided. 
6.2.1. Suggestions on the Theory 
In this thesis, we use the multiple model approach to determine the fault severity. 
This suffers from a drawback of high computational cost when one needs to estimate 
the fault severity accurately. Based on the fact that the symbolic linear model includes 
the fault variables as parameter, this symbolic model can also be used for fault severity 
estimation.  
 Also, the proposed approach can be extended to modify the nonlinear multiple-
model approach such as the extended Kalman filter (EKF). More precisely, in the EKF 
one needs to numerically linearize the original nonlinear system and for different faulty 
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systems. Therefore, by using the proposed symbolic linearization methods the system is 
first linearized and then by substituting different fault severities, one can obtain 
different faulty models. 
Moreover, in this thesis we assume a perfect model for the original system. In 
presence of modeling error, one has to use the hybrid approaches by using artificial 
intelligence and model based methods. Generalizing the proposed method for the 
hybrid systems is another suggestion for future work. In other words, if the neural 
network that is used to compensate for the modeling error is updated, can one compute 
the linear model without performing the linearization process completely? 
6.2.2. Suggestions on the Application   
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the behavior of the power station plant and jet engine 
(at cruise mode) are almost the same. Therefore, by applying the proposed method on 
different types of gas turbines can be the first step for future work on the application 
side.  
The dual spool gas turbines have two compressors and turbines namely as high 
pressure and low pressure. Hence, the nonlinear model of these engines is more 
complicated as compared with the single spool ones. The proposed symbolic 
linearization methodology can be investigated as well for dual spool gas turbines.  
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